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I. INTRODUCTION
Derivatives have received their fair share of the blame for
the 2008 financial crisis.' American International Group, Inc.
(AIG), the large insurance company that became the poster child
of the financial meltdown required $180 billion in government
bailout funds to cover losses from derivatives trading.2 Indeed, the
now infamous credit derivative, the collateralized debt obligation
(CDO), was responsible for ninety-four percent of that company's
losses in the crisis. Other large derivatives traders, including The
Bear Stearns Companies, Inc. and Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.
(Lehman Brothers) were also casualties of the financial crisis, each
falling prey to bankruptcy or takeover on account of their
derivatives businesses.
Given the central role derivatives played in the financial
crisis, it is unsurprising that derivatives regulation became a
1. Michael Sackheim et al., Knocking on the Clearinghouse Door: A Lawyer's
Introduction to Cleared OTC Derivatives, FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L. REP., July-
Aug. 2010, at 1, 1.
2. Ronald D. Orol, CFTC, Businesses Clash on Derivatives Rules,
MARKETWATCH (Sept. 21, 2010, 3:22 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/cftc-
business-community-clash-on-derivatives-2010-09-21.
3. CDOs are asset-backed securities that derive their value from a portfolio of
underlying assets, such as mortgages. Frank D'Souza et al., Illuminating the Need for
Regulation in Dark Markets: Proposed Regulation of the OTC Derivatives Market, 12
U. PA. J. Bus. L. 473, 485 (2010). A trust, often called a special purpose vehicle
(SPV), issues securities based on the CDO and these securities receive cash flows
from the underlying assets, e.g. mortgage payments. Id. The securities are typically
broken into "tranches" that receive payments based on their level of risk; that is, the
most senior tranches receive payments first and the lowest tranches, with the highest
rates of return, bear the greatest default risk. Id.
4. Id. at 491.
5. Id. ("Some of the most prominent firms had traded in asset-backed securities,
credit default swaps and other derivatives, and were the hardest hit by the subprime
crisis.... Large losses from CDOs were implicated in both the AIG and Lehman
Brothers failures.").
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political target for reform. On July 21, 2010, Congress passed the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(Dodd-Frank)6 in an effort to rein in the U.S. portion of the $600
trillion over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives industry. In Title VII
of Dodd-Frank, Congress aims to better regulate derivatives
markets by requiring all derivatives to be exchange-traded and
centrally cleared and giving regulatory agencies significant
oversight authority over market participants and transactions.
The highly unpredictable impact of this new regulation of
derivatives markets is worrisome for market participants, including
nonfinancial corporate entities (referred to as nonfinancial "end-
users") that use derivatives to hedge commercial risk.9 While
nonfinancial end-users secured an important exemption from
Dodd-Frank's regulatory requirements that will help ease the cost
burden associated with new regulation, there remains a great deal
6. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (to be codified in scattered sections of
U.S.C.).
7. According to data from the Bank for International Settlements, as of
December 2009 there was $614,674 billion total notional amount outstanding of OTC
derivatives in the G10 countries and Switzerland, which equaled $21,583 billion in
gross market value. Bank for Int'l Settlements, Quarterly Review, A121 tbl.19 (June
2010), available at http://bis.org/statistics/otcder/dtl920a.pdf. Although the size of the
OTC markets is often quoted at the $600 trillion notional value, Michael Chlistalla
argues that gross market value-"the total value of all derivatives contracts globally
if they had to be closed out and settled at market value on a specific date"-better
represents the actual size of the market. MICHAEL CHLISTALLA, DEUTSCHE BANK,
OTC DERIVATIVES: A NEW MARKET INFRASTRUCTURE Is TAKING SHAPE 4 (2010),
available at http://www.dbresearch.com (follow "Research" hyperlink; then follow
"Archive" hyperlink; article is number twelve on the list). He further argues that
gross credit exposure, which is calculated after netting to reduce counterparty risk, is
the best measure of real risk exposure. Id. According to the International Swaps and
Derivatives Association (ISDA), this value was around $3.7 trillion, which is only
fifteen percent of the gross market value. Id.
8. See Dodd-Frank Act §§ 701-774 (to be codified in scattered sections of 7 and
15 U.S.C.).
9. In a letter to Chairman Barney Frank and Rep. Collin Peterson describing
the types of entities referred to as end-users in Dodd-Frank, Chairmen Blanche
Lincoln and Chris Dodd expressed, "These entities could be anything ranging from
car companies to airlines or energy companies who produce and distribute power to
farm machinery manufacturers." 156 CONG. REC. H5248 (daily ed. June 30, 2010)
(letter from Chairmen Lincoln and Dodd entered into the record by Rep. Collin
Peterson). Companies lobbying Congress for the end-user exemption included firms
as diverse as Chicago utility Exelon Corporation, multinational conglomerate 3M
Company, and aerospace and defense corporation The Boeing Company. See
Randall Smith & Sarah N. Lynch, How Overhauling Derivatives Died, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 28, 2009, at 24.
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of uncertainty surrounding implementation of the regulation.10
How the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) define the parameters
of the end-user exemption, and how these institutions respond to
rapidly changing derivatives markets will drive both the
effectiveness of the legislation and the ability of end-users to use
derivatives to hedge commercial risk in the future.
The initial part of this note provides an overview of
derivatives markets, including their role in the economy and how
they have been regulated in the twentieth and twenty-first
centuries."' Part II considers the nature of current derivatives
markets and the role these financial instruments played in the 2008
financial crisis.12 Part III explores the history of derivatives
regulation under the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA)" and the
deregulatory impact of the Commodity Futures Modernization
Act (CFMA) in 2000.14 Part IV then demonstrates how Dodd-
Frank has fundamentally changed the future of derivatives
markets through the imposition of trading and clearing
requirements on derivatives trades.
The remainder of the note focuses on how Dodd-Frank
applies to commercial end-users of derivatives. Part V considers
the wisdom behind the end-user exemption in Dodd-Frank,
outlines the CFTC's and the SEC's initial efforts to define the
exemption, and highlights the uncertainty surrounding
implementation of the regulation, including the potential for
government agencies to directly regulate large commercial end-
16
users as "Major Swap Participants" under Dodd-Frank. Finally,
the note speculates about how Dodd-Frank will impact hedging
transactions and the OTC derivatives landscape generally."7 Upon
analyzing the costs and risks associated with hedging with
derivatives, the note suggests that end-users must better protect
10. See Dodd-Frank Act, sec. 723(a), § 2 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2).
11. See infra Parts II-IV.
12. See infra Part II.
13. 7 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1936).
14. See infra Part III.
15. See infra Part IV.
16. See infra Part V.
17. See infra Part V.
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themselves in derivatives transactions and should carefully
evaluate whether trading OTC contracts using the end-user
exemption is more cost-effective and safer than trading less
18specialized exchange contracts.
II. RISKS POSED BY DERIVATIVES
A derivative is a financial contract under which parties
agree to pay one another based on the value of an underlying
asset." A simple example is a forward contract under which
parties agree to buy and sell an asset in the future for a
predetermined price.20 Corporations can use such a contract to
hedge against foreign exchange rate fluctuations. 21 For example, if
a U.S. corporation must pay a supplier £l million in six months, it
can enter into a forward contract to purchase £1 million in six
months at a predetermined exchange rate.22 If the pound
appreciates relative to the U.S. dollar during that six-month
period, this appreciation will have no impact on the amount the
U.S. corporation must pay when its bill becomes due.2
Consequently, derivatives have become a popular tool for
companies to mitigate the risks associated with their businesses. 24
Derivatives are also effective tools for investors who aim to
speculate about future price movements.25 Unlike in the example
above, an investor can purchase a derivative without using it to
offset underlying business risk.26 To some extent, such speculation
is necessary to create a market for companies using derivatives to
hedge business risk since rarely would there be another company
18. See infra Part V.
19. JOHN C. HULL, OPTIONS, FUTURES, AND OTHER DERIVATIVES 1 (David
Alexander ed., Prentice Hall 6thed. 2006) (1993).
20. Id. at 3.
21. Id. at 4.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 4-5.
24. D'Souza et al., supra note 3, at 487.
25. See Lynn A. Stout, How Deregulating Derivatives Led to Disaster, and Why
Re-Regulating Them Can Prevent Another, LOMBARD STREET, 7 (July 6, 2009)
[hereinafter Stout, Deregulating Derivatives], http://www.finreg21.com/download-




hedging the exact opposite side of the trade. 27  However, since
speculators aim to take a position in the market rather than reduce
exposure, speculation creates riskier markets, particularly when
speculation is the reason behind both sides of the trade.
Rampant speculation in derivatives markets is dangerous
for macroeconomic financial stability because of the "systemic
,,29 30risk" that arises from the interrelatedness of derivatives users.
If a bank defaults on a derivatives contract, it could cause its
transactional counterparty to default on its own outstanding
derivatives contracts with third parties (assuming the counterparty
was relying on income from the derivatives contract to meet its
obligations to third parties)." Within the small and interconnected
group of institutions trading derivatives, massive derivatives losses
at one firm leading to defaults could quickly lead to a chain
reaction of defaults among other firms.32
The 2008 global financial crisis is a recent example of the
systemic risk associated with derivatives use. As homeowners
defaulted on their subprime mortgages, this created a "ripple
effect" through the burgeoning asset backed security market. 4
Institutions that had purchased protection against mortgage
27. See Thomas Lee Hazen, Disparate Regulatory Schemes for Parallel Activities:
Securities Regulation, Derivatives Regulation, Gambling, and Insurance, 24 ANN. REV.
BANKING & FIN. L. 375, 429 (2005).
28. See Stout, Deregulating Derivatives, supra note 25, at 7-8.
29. Systemic risk can be defined as risk that "(i) an economic shock such as
market or institutional failure triggers . .. either (X) the failure of a chain of markets
or institutions or (Y) a chain of significant losses to financial institutions, (ii) resulting
in increases in the cost of capital or decreases in its availability .... ".Steven L.
Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 204 (2008).
30. See D'Souza et al., supra note 3, at 487, 491.
31. See id. at 491 (noting that some observers speculated about the potential for
a "derivatives tsunami," resulting in rampant bank failure and a global credit crisis).
32. See Lynn A. Stout, Why the Law Hates Speculators: Regulation and Private
Ordering in the Market for OTC Derivatives, 48 DUKE L.J. 701, 770-71 (1999)
[hereinafter Stout, Law Hates Speculators] (stating that regulators view systemic risk
as more perilous than excessive speculation in derivatives trading because of the
potential for "cataclysmic derivatives losses" at one institution to pass rapidly to
other trading firms); D'Souza et al., supra note 3, at 491 (noting that the threat of
systemic risk is heightened because derivatives trading is "concentrated in a small
number of interconnected institutions .... ).
33. Stout, Deregulating Derivatives, supra note 25, at 7-8.
34. See D'Souza et al., supra note 3, at 490.
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defaults in the form of credit default swaps (CDS)3 5 demanded
more capital to back up their contracts, and the undercapitalized
investment banks and insurers that had sold this protection were
increasingly unable to meet collateral demands.6 Simultaneously,
the CDO contracts in which these CDS sellers had heavily
invested stopped making payments and plummeted in value.37 This
crippled these institutions, including AIG and Lehman Brothers,
38
and eventually led to their failure.
Further compounding the threat of systemic risk is the
overall lack of transparency in derivatives markets.3 9  Some
derivatives are traded on exchanges, which means there is a high
level of price transparency, efficiency, and stability because of
reporting and clearing requirements." However, exchange-traded
derivatives make up a mere 3.4 percent of the $636,431 billion
derivatives market.4 ' The overwhelming majority of derivatives
are traded over-the-counter.42 This means that counterparties,
typically a corporation and a large financial institution, privately
enter into a highly specialized bilateral agreement to trade a
derivative that is tailored to the parties' hedging or speculating
needs. 43  These transactions have been largely invisible to
35. A credit default swap is a derivative contract that functions like insurance
against the default of a company. HULL, supra note 19, at 507-08. The buyer of the
CDS makes payments to the seller until the CDS expires or the reference entity
suffers a "credit event," such as bankruptcy. Id. If the credit event occurs, the buyer
is entitled to sell a bond for its face value to the seller. Id.
36. See D'Souza et al., supra note 3, at 490. For an explanation of how collateral
operates in derivatives contracts, see infra pp. 184-185.
37. D'Souza et al., supra note 3, at 490-91.
38. Id.
39. See Michael Greenberger, Make Markets be Markets: Out of the Black Hole:
Regulatory Reform of the Over-the-Counter-Derivatives Market, ROOSEVELT
INSTITUTE 99, 99 (Mar. 3, 2010), http://www.makemarketsbemarkets.org (follow
"Read the Report" hyperlink to download PDF).
40. See D'Souza et al., supra note 3, at 482.
41. Aline van Duyn, Financial Markets: Derivative Dilemmas, FIN. TIMES (Aug.
11, 2010), http://www.ft.com (search "Derivative Dilemmas").
42. D'Souza et al., supra note 3, at 483.
43. See id. at 474; Henry T.C. Hu, Swaps, the Modern Process of Financial
Innovation and the Vulnerability of a Regulatory Paradigm, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 333,
364 (1989) [hereinafter Hu, Swaps Modern Process] (noting that financial institutions
help companies hedge with swaps by "tailor[ing] the amount, type, and term of the
swap to the precise needs of the customer"); CHLISTALLA, supra note 7, at 4
(distinguishing OTC contracts, which are "privately negotiated" between
counterparties from derivatives traded on a "public venue").
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regulators and other market participants because they have not
had the same reporting requirements as those traded on
exchanges."
Derivatives users prefer OTC trades because they can
create highly specialized contracts at a lower cost. But as the 2008
financial crisis demonstrated, the combined threats of opaque
markets and high systemic risk can be grave.45 Left unregulated,
OTC market participants would continue to be able to take
positions that could seriously endanger the economy as a whole.
III. DERIVATIVES DEREGULATION
Although the majority of financial derivatives were traded
without regulation prior to Dodd-Frank, this has not always been
the case." Both contract law cases at common law and the CEA,
passed in the wake of the Great Depression, are anti-speculative in
nature and outlaw speculative transactions that are not carried out
on a public exchange. 47  Yet this anti-speculation tide turned
toward the end of the twentieth century as modern economic
theory espoused the benefits of speculative trading, including the
promotion of price efficiency and increased liquidity." In light of
this, the CFTC began deregulating derivatives by exempting
certain OTC contracts from regulation.49 Congress then passed the
Commodity Futures Modernization Act (CFMA) in 2000, which
permitted all OTC derivatives to trade without regulation, thereby
44. Greenberger, supra note 39, at 100.
45. Id. at 112.
46. See Stout, Law Hates Speculators, supra note 32, at 705-06.
47. See, e.g., Irwin v. Williar, 110 U.S. 499, 509 (1884) ("[I]f, under guise of such a
[forward] contract, the real intent be merely to speculate in the rise or fall of prices . .
. then the whole transaction constitutes nothing more than a wager, and is null and
void."); State v. Stripling, 113 Ala. 120, 123-24 (1897) ("One of the most pernicious
forms of gambling is 'speculating in futures,' on margins, and settling differences
only."); Stout, Law Hates Speculators, supra note 32, at 703-04 (arguing that there are
strong anti-speculative underpinnings both in common law and many state and
federal statutes).
48. See Stout, Deregulating Derivatives, supra note 25, at 7.
49. See 7 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (2006); Stout, Deregulating Derivatives, supra note 25,
at 7 (noting that U.S. regulators passed "ad hoc regulatory exemptions" for certain
derivatives, such as interest rate swaps, largely in response to the passage of the
Financial Services Act of 1986 in the United Kingdom that mandated enforcement of
all financial derivatives, regardless of their hedging or speculative nature).
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completing what the CFTC had started.5 0  The CFMA removed
derivatives from CFTC and SEC oversight and mandated the
enforcement of derivatives contracts traded both on and off
exchanges.51 This gave OTC derivatives contracts legal protection
when they previously would not have been enforced in courts, but
prevented any attempts by regulatory agencies to keep derivatives
markets in check.52
CFMA's complete deregulation of OTC markets
corresponds directly to the massive proliferation of OTC contracts
over the last decade.5 ' According to the Bank for International
Settlements (BIS), derivatives contracts in the G10 countries and
Switzerland totaled $636,431 billion in notional value at the end of
2009.54 Of that total, approximately $614,674 billion were privately
arranged OTC derivatives contracts over which regulators had no
authority." Some experts theorize that the deregulation, and the
resulting dramatic growth in OTC derivatives, led directly to the
financial crisis in 2008.56 Undeniably, the prominent role that
derivatives played in the financial crisis made re-regulating
50. See Pub. L. No. 106-554, §§ 302(a), 303(a) (2000) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§
77b-1, 78c-1); Greenberger, supra note 39, at 99, 100 (noting that the CFMA, by
exempting OTC derivatives from the exchange trading and clearing requirements of
the CEA, "in one fell swoop . . . exempt[ed OTC derivatives] from capital adequacy
requirements; reporting and disclosure; regulation of intermediaries; self regulation;
any bars on fraud, manipulation and excessive speculation; and requirements for
clearing").
51. See §§ 302(a), 303(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b-1, 78c-1); Stout,
Deregulating Derivatives, supra note 26, at 7 (arguing that the CFMA removed "legal
constraint on derivatives speculation that dated back not just decades, but
centuries").
52. See Stout, Deregulating Derivatives, supra note 25, at 7.
53. See id.
54. Van Duyn, supra note 41. The notional value of a derivatives contract is a
hypothetical principal amount which parties use to calculate the payments made to
one another under the contract. Hu, Swaps Modern Process, supra note 43, at 347.
For example, in an interest rate swap, counterparties would pay each other the
predetermined interest rate multiplied by the predetermined notional amount. Id. at
347-48. This notional amount, however, is never exchanged by the parties. Id. at 347.
55. See Bank for Int'l Settlements, supra note 7.
56. See Stout, Deregulating Derivatives, supra note 25, at 4 (arguing that the
credit crisis resulted from the fear and uncertainty generated by the collapse of AIG
in the complex and interconnected CDS market); Greenberger, supra note 37, at 100
("It is now conventional wisdom that the unregulated multi-trillion dollar OTC CDS
market fomented a mortgage crisis, then a credit crisis, and finally a 'once-in-a-
century' systemic financial crisis . . . ").
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derivatives a prime target for Congress in Dodd-Frank."
Politicians could no longer ignore the market failures and systemic
risk associated with such an enormous and invisible market.
IV. RE-REGULATION UNDER DODD-FRANK
Title VII of Dodd-Frank tackles OTC derivatives
regulation in three principal ways. With notable exceptions, for all
derivatives trades Title VII of Dodd-Frank mandates: (1) data
collection on dealers, participants, and transactions through
registration and reporting;5 9 (2) central clearing;6 and (3) exchange
trading.1 Through these requirements, Dodd-Frank aims to
provide credit support for derivatives transactions to protect
against default and provide more transparent pricing and trading
information in derivatives markets.62
A. Data Collection
Dodd-Frank aims to enhance the transparency of
derivatives markets by implementing disclosure and conduct
standards for large derivatives traders.63 It requires swap dealers
and major swap participants to register under the Commodity
Exchange Act and perform recordkeeping and reporting duties,
thereby creating a comprehensive picture of derivatives
57. See D'Souza et al., supra note 3, at 477-78; Greenberger, supra note 39, at
100.
58. See generally CHLISTALLA, supra note 7, at 3 (describing the "structural
improvements" regulators aim to achieve in financial markets following the financial
crisis); Greenberger, supra note 39 (describing why the CFMA's deregulation of
derivatives led to unfortunate financial consequences and critiquing regulatory
proposals to remedy the inherent problems derivatives pose to the financial system);
Colleen M. Baker, Regulating the Invisible: The Case of Over-the-Counter
Derivatives, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1287, 1314-21, 1338-76 (2010) (highlighting
"regulatory gaps" that have arisen in derivatives regulation and suggesting
improvements to the current regulatory framework).
59. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, sec. 727, § 2(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1696-97 (2010) (codified as amended at 7
U.S.C. § 2(a)).
60. See id., sec. 723(a)(3), § 2 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2).
61. See id., sec. 733, §7b-2(5h) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 7b-2(5h)).
62. PHILIP MCBRIDE JOHNSON & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, DERIVATIVES
REGULATION §1.02[12A][2] (3d ed. 2004 & Supp. 2010) (forthcoming 2011).
63. Id.
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participants and transactions." Nonfinancial end-users would only
be subject to these requirements to the extent that they qualified
as "Major Swap Participants," as defined by Dodd-Frank.
B. Central Clearing
Prior to Dodd-Frank, OTC contracts, unlike exchange-
traded ones, had no mandated mechanism for providing credit
support to trades." Each party to the bilateral OTC derivatives
contract individually assumed the "credit risk"67 that its
counterparty would default on payments under the contract.6 To
protect against this credit risk, the parties posted collateral at the
outset of the contract and continuously recalculated and
exchanged collateral throughout the life of the contract as the
value of the underlying asset changed. 69  This is where OTC
markets have often failed. Due to the operational inefficiency of
managing collateral on many contracts, OTC market practice has
been to revalue and exchange collateral on a weekly or monthly
basis rather than a daily basis.'o Posting collateral is expensive, so
the amount posted tends to be insufficient if parties negotiate
individually.71 In OTC markets, collateral has typically covered
64. Dodd-Frank employs the same definition of "swap dealer" as the Commodity
Exchange Act. A "swap dealer" is a person who (i) holds itself out as a dealer in
swaps, or (ii) makes a market in swaps, or (iii) regularly enters into swaps with
counterparties as an ordinary course of business for its own account, or (iv) engages
in activity commonly known in the trade as a dealer or market maker in swaps.
Dodd-Frank Act, sec. 721(a)(21), § la (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § la).
65. The CFTC and SEC have proposed a joint rule defining what constitutes a
Major Swap Participant. Further Definition of "Swap Dealer," "Security-Based
Swap Dealer," "Major Swap Participant," "Major Security-Based Swap Participant"
and "Eligible Contract Participant," 75 Fed. Reg. 80,174 (proposed Dec. 21, 2010) (to
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). Under Dodd-Frank, a Major Swap Participant is a
party with a substantial non-hedging position in swaps that gives rise to systemic
economic risk. Dodd-Frank Act, sec. 721(a)(16), § la(33) (codified as amended at 7
U.S.C. § la(33)). For a discussion of the impact of the Major Swap Participant
category on end-users, see infra Part V.D.
66. See supra Part III.
67. "Credit risk" is the risk a party bears when entering a derivatives transaction
that the counterparty to the transaction will default. HULL, supra note 19, at 746.
68. See Hu, Swaps Modern Process, supra note 43, at 347.





only sixty-six percent of overall credit exposure, leaving more than
72one-third of all contracts without coverage.
To overcome these issues, Dodd-Frank mandates that all
derivatives transactions, including OTC derivatives, be centrally
cleared. Under central counterparty (CCP) clearing, market
participants post a set amount of initial margin74 to the CCP. 5
Depending on how the CCP is organized, in some cases it will
convert the bilateral contracts cleared by members into two
separate contracts - one with the CCP and another with each party
involved. Since the CCP takes the place of the counterparty, the
market participant is no longer exposed to the credit risk of the
counterparty, but instead that of the CCP, which is made up of
many members that have all posted collateral to the CCP. 7
In some instances, the CCP will not guarantee contract
performance but will instead provide members with an important
transfer mechanism for shifting a contract from an insolvent party
to another clearing member. Known as trade "portability," this
functionality enables the member to maintain the benefit of the
contract even though the original counterparty cannot meet its
obligations.7 9 Further, since its collateral is segregated in the CCP,
the member may easily transfer collateral to the new contract or
recover its collateral in the event that the contract cannot be
transferred.?
CCPs provide additional protection to members through
mark-to-market collateralization and netting. Unlike OTC
contracts, the CCP requires parties to post or recover collateral at
72. Id.
73. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, sec. 723(a)(3), § 2(h), 124 Stat. 1376, 1675 (2010) (codified as amended
at 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)).
74. Margin is the cash balance in a trader's account with a clearinghouse. HULL,
supra note 19, at 27, 29. If the balance falls below a certain point, called a
maintenance margin, the member must post additional collateral so that it maintains
its balance at a level determined by the clearinghouse. Id.
75. CHLISTALLA, supra note 7, at 8.
76. Id. at 9.
77. See Baker, supra note 58, at 1296-98.
78. Sackheim et al., supra note 1, at 10.
79. Id. at 8.
80. Id. at 10.
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the end of each day based on the outcomes of their trades."' In this
way, mark-to-market collateralization prevents contracts from
having insufficient collateral.82 CCPs also net a member's position
in the event of a default, meaning that if a party defaults on one
contract, it automatically defaults on all outstanding contracts.
Gains from other contracts must be used to offset the losses on
contracts on which it has defaulted.Y This protects counterparties
because a defaulting party cannot continue to reap the benefits of
lucrative contracts while failing to make payments on unfavorable
ones." The lucrative contracts must instead cover the defaulter's
losses.8
The IntercontinentalExchange, the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange, and the NASDAQ Stock Market have all established
new clearinghouses to clear derivatives transactions.8 In clearing
many OTC contracts, however, they will face substantial
challenges. Notably, CCPs can only handle standard derivatives
contracts that have mark-to-market price discovery mechanisms in
transparent and liquid markets.88 This is because CCPs must be
able to take on parties' contracts, net positions across contracts,
and value the risk of parties' positions for collateral calls.89 OTC
derivatives contracts, however, tend to be highly customized due
to the specific nature of each company's business risk.90 Therefore,
without greater standardization of OTC contracts, CCPs will not
81. See CHLISTALLA, supra note 7, at 12.
82. See id. Had mark-to-market collateralization been in place prior to the
financial crisis, the true risk positions of companies holding CDS contracts would
have been apparent far earlier. Matthew Kerfoot, The Impact of Dodd-Frank on the
Post-Crisis Derivatives Markets, DERIVATIVES WEEK (Sept. 2, 2010),
http://www.derivativesweek.com (search "Impact of Dodd-Frank on the Post-Crisis"
to access article). This would have prevented CDS dealers from acquiring risky
positions that had the potential to threaten the dealer's solvency and overall health of
financial markets. Id.
83. See CHLISTALLA, supra note 7, at 9, 10; HULL, supra note 19, at 493.
84. HULL, supra note 19, at 493.
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. Louise Story, A Secretive Banking Elite Rules Derivatives Trading, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 12, 2010, at Al.
88. CHLISTALLA, supra note 7, at 9.
89. Id. at 9, 11.
90. See Baker, supra note 58, at 1299.
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be able to take on, net, and value these contracts, and thus, will be
unable to clear these derivatives.91
C. Exchange Trading
In addition to central clearing, Dodd-Frank mandates that
all derivatives contracts be exchange-traded because a complete
regulatory infrastructure, such as that employed in equity and
futures markets, combines both central clearing and exchange
trading." While central clearing plays a crucial role in assuring
capital adequacy for derivatives transactions, exchange trading is
important to facilitate public and transparent derivatives pricing.
The exchange brings together buyers and sellers of a defined set of
contracts, while the clearinghouse serves as an intermediary
between these traders and the exchange to guarantee contract
performance between parties.94
Unlike OTC contracts, exchange-traded contracts have the
benefit of pricing input from third parties to facilitate price
discovery.95 This is essential for risky derivatives because the
impact of counterparty default on contract price is difficult to
effectively price.96 If contracts are exchange-traded, the market
rather than individual parties to a transaction determines the price
of risk.97 Had all CDSs been exchange-traded prior to the financial
crisis, institutions becoming parties to CDS contracts would have
been able to more accurately assess the risk of CDS dealer defaults
and consequently would have been less likely to take such
excessively risky positions.98
Clearinghouses and exchanges deal with contracts
differently, which has important implications for the level of
standardization required for each to effectively handle a contract."
91. CHLISTALLA, supra note 7, at 4, 9.
92. Greenberger, supra note 39, at 105.
93. Id.
94. See HULL, supra note 19, at 1-2, 29.
95. See D'Souza et al., supra note 3, at 481.
96. See id. at 486.
97. Kerfoot, supra note 82.
98. Id.
99. See CHLISTALLA, supra note 7, at 20.
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For example, an interest rate contract is a different product from
one day to the next in an exchange context because a key term -
the contract's maturity - changes.'m The contract would,
therefore, not be considered standardized for purposes of an
exchange, even though it would be considered standardized in a
clearinghouse context (since day-to-day, the clearinghouse's ability
to value and manage the risk of the contract would be
unchanged).1ox
Overcoming the problem of contract standardization will
prove to be an enormous challenge for the derivatives industry in
adopting the central clearing and exchange trading of OTC
derivatives. Such a transition, however, is likely to suffer less from
impracticality than lack of political will from dealers.'02 Price
discovery through exchange trading enhances market
transparency, but it also reduces dealer profits and available
transactions.'03  As a result, dealers are unlikely to be the
frontrunners in standardizing OTC contracts, which is why nothing
short of a regulatory mandate will result in a comprehensive
framework for exchange trading and clearing derivatives.104
100. See id. An interest rate swap is a derivative contract under which parties
agree to exchange payments based on a notional principal amount multiplied by an
interest rate for a set period of years. HULL, supra note 19, at 149. One party pays
according to a fixed interest rate and receives interest from the counterparty at a
floating rate on the same amount. Id.
101. CHLISTALLA, supra note 7, at 20.
102. See Smith & Lynch, supra note 9. Under the Securities Exchange Act, a
dealer is "any person engaged in the business of buying and selling securities for his
own account" but is referenced more specifically in this context as a large financial
entity, such as an investment bank, that not only trades for its own account but also
makes a market in derivatives. See Securities Exchange Act § 3(a)(5)(A), 15 U.S.C. §
78c. Examples of dealers registered with the SEC that trade derivatives include
Credit Suisse Group AG, Barclays Capital, and Citigroup Inc. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM'N, COMPANY INFORMATION ABOUT AcrIVE BROKER-DEALERS (2010),
available at http://www.sec.gov/foia/bdreports/bd020111.txt.




V. THE END-USER EXEMPTION UNDER DODD-FRANK
A. Rationale
For purposes of the Dodd-Frank end-user exemption,
derivatives end-users are nonfinancial companies that use
derivatives to hedge commercial risk. 05  Given the extensive
benefits of central clearing and exchange trading to
macroeconomic stability, it may seem surprising that Congress
exempted end-users from its legislative requirements. The
congressional record reveals that Congress' rationale centered on:
(1) the potential negative impact to American consumers if firms
suffered cost increases; and (2) the need for the flexibility of OTC
contracts in hedging commercial risk.'*
Upon analysis, the logic behind the end-user exemption is
sound. First of all, derivatives play an essential role in helping
nonfinancial firms manage operations by reducing earnings
volatility and inherent business risks.' 7 According to a survey by
the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA),
ninety-four percent of Fortune 500 firms use derivatives to
mitigate risk.o' Global corporations rely on interest rate and
foreign exchange swaps to shield exposure to currency and interest
105. See End-User Exception to Mandatory Clearing of Security-Based Swaps, 75
Fed. Reg. 79,992, 79,993 (proposed Dec. 21, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt.
240); cf. CHLISTALLA, supra note 7, at 7 ("End users, which can include financial
institutions, have specific risk management concerns that can be mitigated ("hedged")
... .") (emphasis added).
106. In a letter to Barney Frank, former Chairman of the H. Fin. Services Comm.,
and Collin Peterson, ranking member of the H. Agric. Comm., Blanche Lincoln,
former Chairman of the S. Agric., Nutrition, and Forestry Comm., and Chris Dodd,
former Chairman of the S. Banking Comm., express that the principal reason for
including the end-user exemption was the "substantial public interest in keeping
[transaction] costs low [for end-users] (i.e., to provide consumers with stable, low
prices, promote investment, and create jobs.)." 156 CONG. REC. H5248 (daily ed.
June 30, 2010) (letter from Chairmen Lincoln and Dodd entered into the record by
Rep. Collin Peterson). Texas Sen. Kay Hutchinson feared end-users would be unable
to hedge due to the unique nature of OTC contracts, leading them to "choose market
volatility instead of risk-controlling derivatives altogether, exposing Americans to
higher prices, slower economic growth, and more job losses." 56 CONG. REC. S5881
(daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of Sen. Kay Hutchinson).
107. See CHLISTALLA, supra note 7, at 5.
108. Id.
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rate fluctuations, while utilities and basic materials companies tend
to employ commodity derivatives to hedge commercial exposure.109
By hedging, nonfinancial firms can ensure stable input
prices in the face of unpredictable increases, and thereby avoid
passing costs on to consumers or laying off workers."0 For
example, on August 6, 2010, Russia announced an export ban on
wheat due to a severe drought that diminished wheat yield by
thirty to forty percent."' The news led to a price jump of more
than fifty percent for wheat for delivery in December from the
June low.112  However, many major food companies, including
Tyson Foods, Inc., Anheuser-Busch InBev N.V., General Mills,
Inc., Kellogg Company, and Kraft Foods, Inc., had shielded
themselves against the risk of rising wheat prices by buying wheat
derivatives, which meant their operations were largely unaffected
by the price moves.11
Not only that, nonfinancial companies' hedging contracts
tend to be highly customized due to the unique nature of each
firm's business risk.114 Arguably, requiring these firms to trade the
standardized contracts necessary for exchange trading and clearing
would reduce their ability to effectively hedge through customized
contracts."' Indeed, the high demand for bespoke contracts in
OTC markets indicates that firms highly value the ability to tailor
derivatives products to their specific business needs."6
An additional problem for nonfinancial firms is the cost
associated with regulation, which could make hedging
prohibitively expensive. Executives from utility, manufacturing,
and technology companies lobbied for the end-user exemption
109. Id.
110. See Baker, supra note 58, at 1302.
111. See Andrew E. Kramer, Drought in Russia Ripples Beyond the Wheat Fields,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2010, at B3.
112. Id.
113. Javier Blas & Greg Farrell, Hedging Helps Food Producers to Weather
Uncertainty, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2010, at 19.
114. D'Souza et al., supra note 3, at 504.
115. This is the view espoused by Sen. Kay Hutchinson in congressional debate of
Dodd-Frank. See supra note 106.
116. See CHLISTALLA, supra note 7, at 4 ("OTC derivatives markets are
characterized by flexible and tailor-made products, satisfying the demand for
bespoke contracts customized to the specific risks that a user wants to hedge.").
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based on the rationale that they would have to increase prices and
lay off workers due to increased margin requirements. 17
Presumably, this is because the firms would have to post more
collateral to meet clearinghouse requirements than they currently
do under OTC contracts."" Capital tied up in collateral is
expensive because firms cannot use it to generate a return. While
hedging costs are likely to increase for end-users with or without
the exemption due to overall changes in derivatives markets,
requiring these firms to clear and exchange trade would further
increase the cost burden associated with hedging.11 9
Further, due to the small size of the nonfinancial
derivatives hedging market and the types of derivatives end-users
employ, the end-user exemption will not directly conflict with
Congress' goal of improving macroeconomic stability. Of the
$437.2 trillion market for interest rate derivatives, nonfinancial
companies make up only nine percent. 20 Of the $48.7 trillion
market in foreign exchange derivatives, nonfinancial companies
constitute seventeen percent, and of the $6.6 trillion market for
commodities derivatives, nonfinancial companies make up only
ten percent.121 Moreover, the types of derivatives nonfinancial
firms principally use, namely interest rate and foreign exchange
* * 122swaps, were not implicated in the financial crisis. Derivatives
based on commodity prices also played a very minor role in the
crisis.123 Nonfinancial firms rarely employ the equity and credit
derivatives so popular with financial companies that contributed to
124 t
the financial crisis. Given these considerations, if implemented
effectively, the end-user exemption does not appear to
substantially hamper Dodd-Frank's ability to rein in the riskiest
behavior in OTC markets.
117. See Smith & Lynch, supra note 9.
118. See id.
119. See infra Part V.E.4 (arguing that costs of compliance with the end-user
exemption in addition to dealers passing their increased costs from exchange trading
and clearing on to customers will raise hedging costs in the remaining OTC market).
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B. Initial Regulatory Efforts to Define the End- User
Exemption
A larger issue than whether Congress should have included
an end-user exemption in Dodd-Frank is how the CFTC and SEC
will define the exemption so that it effectively exempts legitimate
hedging transactions but does not create a loophole for abuse. 25
Dodd-Frank considers a party an "end-user," exempted from
clearing and trading derivatives transactions - if it: (1) is not a
financial entity;126 (2) is hedging its own commercial risk; and (3)
notifies the Commission of how it meets financial obligations of
swaps that are not cleared.127
This language gives the CFTC and SEC substantial
discretion in establishing a framework for distinguishing end-user
hedging transactions from speculative trades. However, ranking
members of Congress, both immediately following Dodd-Frank's
passage and since regulatory agencies have commenced
rulemaking, have repeatedly admonished the CFTC and SEC to
avoid creating an overly-narrow end-user exemption. Most
125. The CFTC and SEC share jurisdiction over the issue since Dodd-Frank
continues the distinction in the Securities Exchange Act between swaps, regulated by
the CFTC, and security-based swaps, regulated by the SEC. See Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 711, 124 Stat.
1376, 1641 (2010) (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § la).
126. Dodd-Frank defines a "financial entity" as (i) a swap dealer; (ii) a security-
based swap dealer; (iii) a major swap participant; (iv) a major security-based swap
participant; (v) a commodity pool as defined in section la(10) of the Commodity
Exchange Act; (vi) a private fund as defined in section 202(a) of the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C.§ 80b-2(a)); (vii) an employee benefit plan as defined
in paragraphs (3) and (32) of section 3 of the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. § 1002); (viii) a person predominantly engaged in activities
that are in the business of banking or financial in nature, as defined in section 4(k) of
the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956. Dodd-Frank Act, sec. 723(a)(3), § 2
(codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2). Dodd-Frank leaves it up to the discretion of
the SEC whether to exempt small banks, savings associations, farm credit system
institutions, and credit unions with total assets under $10 billion under the end-user
exemption. Id. at 1680. Under Proposed Rule 3Cg-1, the SEC has proposed
alternative language to include these institutions in the end-user exemption. End-
User Exception to Mandatory Clearing of Security-Based Swaps, 75 Fed. Reg.
79,992, 79,993 (proposed Dec. 21, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240); see infra
Part V.D for Commission proposals on the definition of Major Swap Participant.
127. Dodd-Frank Act, sec. 723(a)(3), § 2 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2).
128. In a letter to Chairman Frank and Rep. Peterson, Chairmen Lincoln and
Dodd expressed, "[Congress] created a robust end user clearing exemption for those
entities that are using the swaps market to hedge or mitigate commercial risk. . ..
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recently, in a comment letter in response to the SEC's proposed
rule on the end-user exception, Representatives Spencer Bachus
and Frank Lucas expressed "serious concerns" about the impact of
Title VII of Dodd-Frank on American companies and emphasized
that "[e]nd-users must be able to rely upon their exemption from
the clearing and exchange trading requirements without having to
overcome unnecessary bureaucratic obstacles."129 Consequently,
the CFTC and SEC are in the difficult position of implementing a
wide congressional mandate to regulate the vast and unregulated
derivatives market, while still respecting stringent boundaries -
namely, without "damag[ing] America's economic engine - the
manufacturers, technology companies, real estate developers, and
companies that provide vital financing to consumers and American
businesses.,,
3 0
The SEC's initial attempts to strike this balance address
logistical matters - for example, the proposed rule on the end-user
exemption designates mechanisms for end-users to notify
regulators of how they are meeting the financial obligations of
swaps that are not cleared.13' But more importantly, these initial
proposals focus on the potential for abuse of the end-user
exemption. Proposed Rule 3Cg-1 requires end-users to notify the
SEC each time they invoke the exemption and provide the SEC
with information to ensure that they qualify, including the identity
These entities did not get us into this crisis and should not be punished for Wall
Street's excesses. They help to finance jobs and provide lending for communities all
across this nation. That is why Congress provided regulators the authority to exempt
these institutions." 156 CONG. REC. H5248 (daily ed. June 30, 2010) (letter from
Chairmen Lincoln and Dodd entered into the record by Rep. Collin Peterson).
129. Letter from Rep. Spencer Bachus and Rep. Frank Lucas to Treasury Sec.
Timothy Geithner, CFTC Chairman Gary Gensler, SEC Chairman Mary Shapiro,
and Fed. Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke (Dec. 16, 2010) (on file with the SEC),
available at http://sec.gov/comments/s7-39-10/s73910-5.pdf.
130. Id.
131. Specifically, Proposed Rule 3Cg-1 provides that an end-user may
demonstrate how it will meet its financial obligations under the swap through a
written credit support agreement, a written agreement to pledge or segregate assets,
a written third-party guarantee, the counterparty's available financial resources, or
other means of meeting its financial obligations other than those described above.
End-User Exception to Mandatory Clearing of Security-Based Swaps, 75 Fed. Reg.
at 79,994-95.
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of the counterparty relying on the exemption and information
regarding the party's status as a nonfinancial entity.213
C. The Persistent Problem of Distinguishing Hedging from
Speculating
Arguably, the most problematic part of policing the end-
user exemption, however, is distinguishing when an end-user is
"hedging or mitigating commercial risk" rather than taking a
speculative position in derivatives markets. The changing nature
of modern corporations further complicates this task.' Many
nonfinancial entities, such as companies dealing in commodity
derivatives, use derivatives to speculate about commodities prices
in addition to hedge business risks, while other companies operate
similarly to hedge funds and pursue their own investment
strategies.134 For example, in the first half of 2007, the luxury car
manufacturer, Porsche Automobil Holding SE, earned three times
more on derivatives trades than on car sales.
Initial agency attempts to distinguish transactions that are
"hedging or mitigating commercial risk" for the end-user
exemption use the "economically appropriate" standard
established by rules for defining "bona fide hedging" positions in
futures markets under the Commodities Exchange Act.' Under
proposed Rule 3a67-4, the SEC has proposed that a position be
considered "hedging or mitigating commercial risk" under Dodd-
Frank if:
[S]uch position is economically appropriate to the
reduction of risks that are associated with the
present conduct and management of a commercial
enterprise, where such risks arise from: [t]he
132. See id. at 79,998.
133. See Michelle Price, Hitting the Wrong Target, BANKER, Oct. 1, 2010.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Commodity Exchange Act, 17 C.F.R. § 1.3(z) (2010); Further Definition of
"Swap Dealer," "Security-Based Swap Dealer," "Major Swap Participant," "Major
Security-Based Swap Participant" and "Eligible Contract Participant," 75 Fed. Reg.
80,174, 80,217 (proposed Dec. 21, 2010) (to be codified 17 C.F.R. 240).
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potential change in the value of assets . . . liabilities
[or] . . . services . . . in the ordinary course of
business of the enterprise.'37
This recently proposed definition mirrors CEA Rule 1.3(z),
which the CFTC uses to distinguish hedging from speculating
positions in the context of futures markets."'8 Under the CEA,
positions that qualify as bona fide hedges are exempt from
mandated speculative position limits.'39 According to commentary
under proposed Rule 3a67-4, the CFTC and SEC may consider the
existing interpretations of the language "economically
appropriate" used by the CFTC in applying CEA Rule 1.3(z) if the
interpretations apply in the swap context.140
Looking to agency interpretations of Rule 1.3(z), however,
gives little insight into how this standard may play out in modern
137. Further Definition of "Swap Dealer," "Security-Based Swap Dealer," "Major
Swap Participant," "Major Security-Based Swap Participant" and "Eligible Contract
Participant," 75 Fed. Reg. at 80,217. The CFTC and SEC proposed to use this
standard of "hedging or mitigating commercial risk" both for purposes of
determining which transactions qualify for the end-user exemption and which
positions are exempted from calculating an entity's position for purposes of
determining if it qualifies as a Major Swap Participant. Id. at 80,195. The SEC
adopts this proposal into Proposed Rule 3Cg-1(a)(4). End-User Exception to
Mandatory Clearing of Security-Based Swaps, 75 Fed. Reg. at 80,000. For a
discussion of the impact of Major Swap Participant classification, see infra Part V.D.
138. Rule 1.3(z)(1) defines bona fide hedging transactions and positions as
transactions or positions in a contract for future delivery on any
contract market, or in a commodity option, where such
transactions or positions normally represent a substitute for
transactions to be made or positions to be taken at a later time in a
physical marketing channel, and where they are economically
appropriate to the reduction of risks in the conduct and
management of a commercial enterprise, and where they arise
from: (i) The potential change in the value of assets which a person
owns, produces, manufactures, processes, or merchandises . . . (ii)
The potential change in the value of liabilities . . . (iii) The
potential change in the value of services ....
Commodity Exchange Act, 17 C.F.R. § 1.3(z) (2010).
139. 7 U.S.C. § 6a(c)(1) (2006); Blake Imel et al., CFTC's Hedging Definition-
Development and Contemporary Issues, in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, THE
COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION: CURRENT ISSUES 269, 273 (1985).
140. See Further Definition of "Swap Dealer," "Security-Based Swap Dealer,"
"Major Swap Participant," "Major Security-Based Swap Participant" and "Eligible
Contract Participant," 75 Fed. Reg. at 80,195.
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
derivatives markets. Historically, the CFTC has applied the Rule
1.3(z) definition of bona fide hedging both to exempt hedging
transactions from futures position limits and to approve new
futures contracts for exchange trading.141 For a futures contract to
be approved for an exchange, a board of trade had to show that it
could be used for bona fide hedging or price basing. 14 Under
CFTC Guideline 1, this meant that the contract had to pass the
economic purpose test, which required dealers to show that a
contract served an "economic purpose" beyond mere speculation
and that its value superseded any negative impact from
speculation. 4 3 In this way, the economic purpose test aimed to
ensure that proposed futures contracts facilitated pricing and
hedging in the underlying asset.'"
The CFTC still maintains the economic purpose test as part
of its policy, although it is not stringently enforced. 4 5 In 1982, the
CFTC stopped requiring exchanges to demonstrate a contract's
economic purpose and justify the contract terms.146 In 2000, the
CFTC then eliminated the requirement of CFTC approval for the
introduction of new contracts.47 Consequently, there is little
modern agency interpretation of what has been labeled the
"weak" economic purpose test, and therefore it is unclear how the
141. See Imel et al., supra note 139, at 273.
142. Id.
143. See Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 20,041 (May 13, 1975). As CFTC
regulation describes it, "The economic purpose test requires a board of trade to
demonstrate that transactions for future delivery in a commodity are, or reasonably
can be expected to be, quoted and disseminated for price basing, or utilized as a
means of hedging against possible loss through fluctuations in price." Economic and
Public Interest Requirements for Contract Market Designation, 47 Fed. Reg. 49,832,
49,836 (Nov. 3, 1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 5).
144. Thomas Lee Hazen, Rational Investments, Speculation, or Gambling?-
Derivative Securities and Financial Futures and Their Effect on the Underlying Capital
Markets, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 987, 1029-31 (1992).
145. Id.
146. In an interpretive guideline, the CFTC stated, "The Commission has
determined under the revised guideline, however, not to routinely require statements
from, or reports of interviews with, potential market users concerning economic
purpose." Economic and Public Interest Requirements for Contract Market
Designation, 47 Fed. Reg. 49,832, 49,837 (Nov. 3, 1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
pt. 5); see also Peter H. Huang, A Normative Analysis of New Financially Engineered
Derivatives, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 471, 506 (2000) (describing the evolution of the
CFTC's process for approving new futures contracts for exchange trading).
147. Huang, supra note 146, at 506.
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CFTC and SEC (the "Commissions") would apply the
''economically appropriate" standard in the context of
distinguishing end-user hedging transactions.4 8
This lack of clarity on what constitutes an "economically
appropriate" hedge position is troublesome in that it may not
sufficiently limit what qualifies as a transaction "hedging or
mitigating commercial risk." The Commissions have solicited
comment on this point and even suggested limiting the qualified
hedge transactions to nonfinancial commodities in order to limit
their scope. 149 The overall tone of the proposed rule commentary,
however, is permissive. For example, whether a transaction
qualifies as a hedge will "take into account the person's overall
hedging and risk mitigation strategies.""so By employing complex
"risk mitigating strategies," creative end-users could obscure
whether their transactions are risk mitigating or speculation in
disguise. In seemingly sweeping language, the Commissions state,
"the proposal covers swaps hedging or mitigating any of a person's
business risks, regardless of their status under accounting
guidelines"'1 or the bona fide hedging exemption."152 This
language, coupled with recent congressional admonishments,
148. See id.
149. See Further Definition of "Swap Dealer," "Security-Based Swap Dealer,"
"Major Swap Participant," "Major Security-Based Swap Participant" and "Eligible
Contract Participant," 75 Fed. Reg. 80,174, 80,195-96 (proposed Dec. 21, 2010) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
150. Id. at 80,195.
151. Hedge accounting is an accounting standard that reduces earnings volatility
by permitting companies to recognize gains or losses from a hedging contract in the
same period as the gains or losses from the item it is hedging. See HULL, supra note
19, at 39. Under standard accounting practices, an entity must recognize gains and
losses from a futures contract when they occur. Id. Hedge accounting, however,
allows companies to defer recognition of gains and losses on hedging contracts that
otherwise would have to be recognized, thereby reducing swings in the value of either
position. See Henry T.C. Hu, Hedging Expectations: "Derivative Reality" and the
Law and Finance of the Corporate Objective, 73 TEx. L. REV. 985, 1040 (1995).
Limiting the end-user exemption to positions that qualify for hedge accounting would
preclude many bona fide hedging transactions from receiving the exemption because
often companies hedge with similar but more cost-effective proxy products that do
not move directly in line with the product being hedged. See Price, supra note 133.
As a result, the commercial hedge with a similar product would not meet hedge
accounting requirements. Id.
152. Further Definition of "Swap Dealer," "Security-Based Swap Dealer," "Major
Swap Participant," "Major Security-Based Swap Participant" and "Eligible Contract
Participant," 75 Fed. Reg. at 80,195.
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suggests a broad interpretation of what will qualify as a transaction
"hedging or mitigating commercial risk" that could lead to abuse,
both by nonfinancial entities and the large investment banks that
are counterparties to these trades.
D. End-Users as Major Swap Participants
Even if the hedging transactions of a large nonfinancial
firm qualify under the end-user exemption, the exemption will
prove unhelpful if the firm falls into the category of "Major Swap
Participant" (MSP) and consequently is subject to additional
regulation under Dodd-Frank."' In Dodd-Frank, a MSP is defined
as a party with a substantial non-hedging position in swaps that
gives rise to systemic economic risk. 54 Qualifying as a MSP will
mean that a company must register with the CFTC or the SEC,
perform recordkeeping duties, satisfy capital and margin
requirements, and comply with regulatory business conduct
standards."'
The CFTC and SEC are responsible for defining the MSP
category, and large commercial derivatives hedgers have expressed
concern that if the category is broadly defined, they could be
deemed MSPs.'16 However, fears that nonfinancial firms qualifying
for the end-user exemption will fall in the MSP category are likely
153. Dodd-Frank defines "Major Swap Participant" and "Major Security Based
Swap Participant." The categories are functionally the same, requiring enhanced
reporting requirements, but are distinguishable regarding the type of swaps the entity
trades and the regulatory agency with jurisdiction over the regulation. The categories
continue the distinction under the Securities Exchange Act between swaps and
security-based swaps with the former under CFTC jurisdiction and the latter under
SEC jurisdiction. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, secs. 721(a)(16), 731, 761a(6), 124 Stat. 1376, 1663, 1703, 1755
(2010), § 3(a)(68) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(68)); Securities
Exchange Act § 3(a)(68), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(68); see also, Christopher Doering,
CFTC Roll-out of Swaps Reform Begins to Take Shape, REUTERS, Sept. 21, 2010,
http://www.reuters.comlarticle/idUSN2116959420100921 (documenting the concerns
of nonfinancial companies hedging commercial risk that they may be labeled "Major
Swap Participants" under Dodd-Frank).
154. Id., sec. 721(a)(16), § la(33) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § la(33)).
155. See id., sec. 731, § 4s (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 4s).
156. Orol, supra note 2; Price, supra note 133 (citing a memo from law firm
Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP stating that it was "unclear whether the
number of end-users required to register as a major swap participant will be 10,000 or
10: it is left to the regulators").
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exaggerated. CFTC Chairman Gary Gensler has stated that a
company's derivatives trading would have to be "substantial
enough to be relevant to the economy or the financial system as a
whole" to qualify as a MSP and has emphasized that the majority
of end-users are unlikely to fit this description.'- The
congressional record is clear that Congress did not intend for firms
hedging commercial risk to be regulated as MSPs."8
Further, initial regulatory proposals rebut such a
classification. In a joint proposal, the CFTC and SEC have
outlined three tests for falling in the MSP category; only one
potentially applies to hedging commercial end-users.' If an end-
user creates "substantial counterparty exposure that could have
serious adverse effects on the financial stability of the United
States banking system or financial markets," it would fall in the
MSP category.'60 This calculation includes hedging positions, but
the proposed thresholds to qualify are high.' Consequently, while
157. Doering, supra note 153.
158. In a letter to Chairman Barney Frank and Rep. Collin Peterson on the
treatment of end-users, Chairmen Blanche Lincoln and Chris Dodd clarified that
Congress does not intend to regulate end-users as Major Swap
Participants or Swap Dealers just because they use swaps to hedge
or manage the commercial risks associated with their business. For
example, the Major Swap Participant and Swap Dealer definitions
are not intended to include an electric or gas utility that purchases
commodities that are used either as a source of fuel to produce
electricity or to supply gas to retail customers and that uses swaps
to hedge or manage the commercial risks associated with its
business.
156 CONG. REC. H5248 (daily ed. June 30, 2010) (letter from Chairmen Lincoln and
Dodd entered into the record by Rep. Collin Peterson).
159. The first test includes firms that maintain a "substantial position" in the
major swap categories as defined by the CFTC and SEC, but excludes positions
hedging or mitigating commercial risk. The Commissions propose adopting a
definition of "hedging or mitigating commercial risk" identical to the definition of
"hedging or mitigating commercial risk" for purposes of qualifying for the end-user
exemption. See supra Part V.C. The third test applies only to financial entities, and
consequently would not apply to nonfinancial end-users. Further Definition of
"Swap Dealer," "Security-Based Swap Dealer," "Major Swap Participant," "Major
Security-Based Swap Participant" and "Eligible Contract Participant," 75 Fed. Reg.
80,147, 80,185-86 (proposed Dec. 21, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
160. Id. at 80,186.
161. The CFTC has proposed that "substantial counterparty exposure" to qualify
as a MSP would require current uncollateralized exposure of $5 billion, or a
combined current uncollateralized exposure and potential future exposure of $8
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it is possible for a nonfinancial end-user to qualify as a MSP, such
a classification appears highly unlikely.
E. Potential Impact on OTC Markets
Although many unknowns remain regarding how
regulators will flesh out the specifics of the end-user exemption,
hedging transactions and the OTC derivatives landscape are
generally ripe for change in the wake of extensive regulation. The
impact of the legislation's costs and benefits will drive the
landscape of the derivatives industry over the next ten years.
1. Impact of the Exemption
The success of Title VII in reining in OTC derivatives
markets will turn in large part on how effectively regulatory
agencies police the loopholes. The end-user exemption Congress
enacted is fairly narrow, but agency implementation will ultimately
drive its effect. 62 Presuming the CFTC and SEC can distinguish
transactions that are legitimately "hedging commercial risk," there
is likely to be a substantial reduction in OTC markets, given that
nonfinancial hedgers currently constitute such a small percentage
of the market.
The difficulty of distinguishing hedging and speculative
trades - especially if obscured in complex "risk mitigation
strategies" - could result in a blanket exemption for the
derivatives activities of nonfinancial firms. Congress has
persistently advocated for regulatory leniency with nonfinancial
end-users, and initial rulemaking efforts by regulators are
consistent with a broad exemption.'" Accordingly, it is fair to
billion across the entirety of an entity's swap positions. Id. at 80,198. The thresholds
for "Major Security Based Swap Participants' (MSBSP) are lower. Id. To qualify as a
MSBSP, the SEC has proposed that an entity maintain current uncollateralized
exposure of $2 billion, or a combined current uncollateralized exposure and potential
future exposure of $4 billion, across the entirety of an entity's security-based swap
positions. Id.
162. Sackheim et al., supra note 1, at 7.
163. See supra Part V.C.
164. See supra Part V.C.
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conclude that large banks will feel the brunt of regulation under
Dodd-Frank, while nonfinancial companies will escape relatively
unscathed.165
2. The Impending Transition
Despite a potentially lenient end-user exemption, the
massive OTC market of the last decade will be fundamentally
different as Dodd-Frank drives the majority of OTC trades to
exchange trading and central clearing.16 6 Even before the CFTC
had proposed initial rules, clearing organizations were already
seeing significant increases in the clearing of what were previously
OTC trades.167 For example, Eris Exchange, an organization that
converts OTC contracts to futures and uses the CME Group to
clear, transacted $3 billion worth of swaps between its opening in
July, 2010 and October, 2010.'6 LCH Clearnet - the largest
derivatives clearing organization, handling around one-third of
inter-dealer interest rate swaps - now offers dealer-to-customer
169
swaps in addition to dealer-to-dealer transactions. The
eagerness with which derivatives traders are beginning to use
clearing facilities ahead of regulation indicates that the OTC
derivatives landscape will transform quickly.o Promising levels of
initial volume at clearinghouses mean that traffic is likely to
continue to increase at these venues, and OTC markets are on
course for fundamental changes."'
3. Commercial End-Users and the Need for Derivative Protection
Contrary to the general market trend, however,
commercial end-users have been more reluctant to transition to
165. See Cheyenne Hopkins, Carve-Outs Abound in Reform Law, AM. BANKER,
Aug. 10, 2010.
166. See Sackheim et al., supra note 1, at 7.
167. Ann Saphir, Swaps Clearing Wins Converts After Crisis, REUTERS, Oct. 10,
2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE68R5I220100 92 8.
168. Id.
169. Smith & Lynch, supra note 9.
170. See Saphir, supra note 167.
171. See id.
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central clearing. According to a survey by Greenwich Associates,
less than twenty-five percent of companies that use commodities
derivatives say they currently clear their derivatives trades with a
central clearing party and only twenty-five percent expect to over
112the next year.
It would be imprudent, however, for nonfinancial firms
hedging with derivatives to ignore the problems derivatives posed
in the financial crisis and the changing nature of derivatives
markets post Dodd-Frank. The ISDA agreements that have
traditionally governed swaps transactions highly favor swaps
dealers and provide little credit protection for end-users.17
Although both parties to the transaction can require the other to
post additional collateral, typically end-users do not do this in
practice.174 Therefore, if nonfinancial firms continue to avoid
central clearing and exchange trading derivatives, they must
protect themselves against bilateral credit risk by requiring more
demanding terms in OTC agreements."'
4. The Reality of Increased Hedging Costs
Regardless of whether end-users transition to central
clearing and exchange trading or continue to use OTC contracts,
the cost of hedging with derivatives for end-users will increase. If
end-users transition to the exchanges, they will face increased
margin requirements, thereby incurring the opportunity cost of
having capital tied up.176 If firms employ a mix of centrally cleared
and custom swaps, they will be unable to net exposure across the
two types of contracts, which will demand higher margin
requirements overall.' Alternatively, if nonfinancial companies
172. Derivative Rules to Increase Commodity Hedging Costs: Study, FUTURES
MAG., Sept. 20, 2010, http://www.futuresmag.com/News/2010/9/Pages/Derivative-
rules-will-increase-commodity-hedging-costs-Study.aspx.
173. Sackheim et al., supra note 1, at 1.
174. Id.
175. For example, Michael Sackheim suggests that nonfinancial end-users should
contract for the ability to demand additional collateral and a right to terminate the
agreements upon a ratings downgrade of the opposite party in OTC agreements. Id.
at 10.
176. See id. at 18, 19.
177. See MAYER BROWN, END-USERS AND OTC ENERGY DERIVATIVES:
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rely solely on OTC contracts, they must provide the CFTC and
SEC with the necessary documentation to comply with the
exemption, which will require costly system development."'
Finally, as noted above, exchange trading and central clearing
reduce dealer profit margins.1' Dealers will likely shift these
increased costs to customers in both the exchange-traded and OTC
contexts.'so
Due to the reality of increasing hedging costs after Dodd-
Frank, end-users should evaluate whether the savings from failing
to exchange trade and clear their derivatives trades is worth the
additional credit risk in the post Dodd-Frank derivatives
landscape. Firms have relied on complex OTC contracts to hedge
commercial risk only in recent history and should thoughtfully
evaluate whether trading such complex instruments is necessary
when less risky exchange-traded hedging instruments are available
to hedge most types of commercial risk.
VI. CONCLUSION
Hedging commercial risk is an increasingly important
business practice for many large corporations, and Dodd-Frank
has dramatically changed the landscape of derivatives markets on
which these companies rely.'8' Large banks will feel the greatest
impact of new regulation, as they are subject to the most stringent
directives of Dodd-Frank.182 However, the impact on nonfinancial
end-users hedging commercial risk remains unclear due to the
uncertainty surrounding the CFTC's and SEC's implementation of
the legislation.83 The fact that initial regulatory proposals indicate
that the end-user exemption will be broad should not lull
nonfinancial firms into maintaining their current derivatives
POTENTIAL IMPACTS UNDER THE WALL STREET TRANSPARENCY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 2010, at 2 (Aug. 27, 2010), available at
http://www.mayerbrown.com/dodd-frankact/article.asp?id=9540&nid=13007.
178. See supra Part V.B.
179. See supra Part IV.B-C.
180. See Smith & Lynch, supra note 9; Sackheim et al., supra note 1, at 18, 22.
181. See supra Part V.
182. See supra Part V.D.1.
183. See supra Part V.D.1.
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practices. OTC derivatives markets will be strikingly different
after Dodd-Frank, as more transactions move to exchanges and
dealers respond to regulatory demands.'8 In this changing
environment, end-users should protect themselves from
counterparty risk by demanding more favorable terms in ISDA
agreements that notoriously favor dealers and using cleared
derivatives contracts when possible.'8 ' Hedging commercial risk
will be more expensive for end-users post Dodd-Frank, with or
without an exemption; however, these costs are worthwhile if
regulation enhances the financial stability of derivatives trading.8 6
End-users should stay informed about market and regulatory
developments to capitalize on a dramatically new environment for
hedging commercial risk.
LAURIN C. ARIAIL
184. See supra Part V.D.2.
185. See supra Part V.D.3.
186. See supra Part V.D.4.
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